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“Economic Impact” in Regulatory Takings Law 
Steven J. Eagle* 
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I. Introduction
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the
Court’s decisions have identified several factors that have partic-
ular significance.  The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant
and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has inter-
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fered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of 
course, relevant considerations.  So, too, is the character of the 
governmental action.  A “taking” may more readily be found when 
the interference with property can be characterized as a physical 
invasion by government, than when interference arises from 
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of eco-
nomic life to promote the common good.1 
This Article discusses and evaluates the role of the Penn Central “eco-
nomic impact of the regulation on the claimant” test in takings law, and how 
that impact should be measured.  Part I begins with a conceptual discussion 
of the relationship between property and its owner for purposes of takings 
claims.  Part II then considers how “economic impact” should be defined and 
measured, with emphasis on recent cases. 
It is not clear why the “economic impact” of a government action af-
fecting property should be relevant to whether there has been a taking.  After 
all, an insurance company, for instance, must pay indemnification regardless 
of the impact of a casualty loss on the insured’s wealth.  The short answer is 
that the Supreme Court generally ascertains whether there has been a “tak-
ing” in the first instance by using the ad-hoc, multifactor test that had its 
genesis in Penn Central, and that “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on 
the claimant” is one of three factors that Penn Central identified as having 
“particular significance.”2 
Summing up its regulatory takings jurisprudence, the Court stated, in 
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,3 that “the Penn Central inquiry turns in large 
part . . . upon the magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and the de-
gree to which it interferes with legitimate property interests.”4  The “legiti-
mate interest” clause of that quotation should be related to another state-
ment in Penn Central: “Primary among those [three enumerated] factors are 
‘[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the 
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations.”5  Some lower courts have inferred from this “particu-
lar” emphasis that “investment-backed expectations” is “the primary” Penn 
1. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (internal
citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
2. Id.
3. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
4. Id. at 540.
5. Id. at 538-39 (emphasis added).
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Central factor.6  From that perspective, it seems the Court has relegated the 
“economic impact” factor to a secondary role, and consequently failed to de-
lineate the factor’s contours with respect to “investment-backed expecta-
tions” or to provide more guidance as to how “impact” should be calculated. 
“[E]conomic impact . . . on the claimant” must take into account not 
only “distinct investment backed expectations,” but also the “character” of 
the governmental action, and possibly other factors as well.  We also must 
consider that “impact,” as the U.S. Supreme Court sketches it, has a dimen-
sion of “what” is affected as well as “who” is affected.  These two dimensions 
emerge from Penn Central’s reference to the unit of property affected as the 
“parcel as a whole.”7 
Because of Penn Central’s “chronic vagueness,” Professor John Echever-
ria noted, the Supreme Court “appeared poised to jettison” the case’s analy-
sis completely.8  However, perhaps for want of a better alternative, the Court 
subsequently confirmed Penn Central as the “polestar” of its regulatory tak-
ings jurisprudence.9  With tepid praise, Professor Echeverria looked back at 
Penn Central as “the only plausible path to reform of regulatory takings doc-
trine,” and added that “the challenge ahead is figuring out how to con-
vert Penn Central into the foundation for a manageable legal doctrine.”10  Our 
work is cut out for us. 
Although the Supreme Court in Penn Central described the three factors 
it mentioned only as possessing “particular significance,” it has become 
conventional for courts to treat their enumeration as a comprehensive 
checklist.  Thus, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently 
noted: “Penn Central considered and balanced three factors: (1) economic im-
pact, (2) reasonable investment backed expectations, and (3) the character 
of the government action.”11  In various cases, including one examined later 
6. See Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010) (assert-
ing “That ‘primary factor,’ ‘the extent to which the regulation has interfered with dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations,’ is fatal to the Guggenheims’ claim.”). 
7. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31.
8. John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS 10471, 10471 (2009).  
9. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 336 (2002) (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
10. Echeverria, supra note 8, at 10472.  This seems reminiscent of then-
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s observation that “you go to war with 
the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time.”  Eric 
Schmitt, Troops’ Queries Leave Rumsfeld on the Defensive, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at A1. 
11. Hearts Bluff Game Ranch, Inc. v. United States, 669 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (quoting Schooner Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. United States, 569 F.3d 1359, 
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in this Article, CCA Associates v. United States,12 the Court has declined to exam-
ine the extent to which other tests should be included in the balance,13 how 
the three enumerated tests might be weighted, or how many tests the 
claimant has to satisfy, and by what standard.14 
As Professor John Fee observed, “[t]he factors that Penn Central says to 
balance . . . cannot be reconciled with a classical conception of property 
rights.”15  In the present author’s view, evaluating “the claimant” and “eco-
nomic impact” under Penn Central and its progeny is an exercise in building 
upon what Professor Carol Rose memorably termed “crystals and mud.”16  As 
it has metastasized, Penn Central has become an amalgam of hard-edged 
tests, prongs, and demands for calculations reeking of precision, all resting 
upon a foundation that is imprecise, subjective, and self-referential in na-
ture. 
II. Evaluating “the Claimant” and “Economic Impact”
A. The Constitution, the Takings Clause and Property
Normally, property rights with respect to things are a function of the 
general law and any preexisting relationship among the parties that might 
give rise to privity of contract.  Thus, grocers are not obligated to sell food to 
needy persons at a discounted price in the absence of an agreement to do 
so.17  On the other hand, the State, serving as a mediating institution, might 
distribute food stamps and impose the cost on taxpayers.  Providing for the 
1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).  Interestingly, Hearts Bluff did not quote the following sen-
tence in the earlier case: “Penn Central provides an ad hoc analysis allowing holistic 
consideration of the relevant factors.”  Schooner Harbor, 569 F.3d at 1362. 
12. CCA Assocs. v. United States, 667 F.3d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 129
S.Ct. 1313 (Feb. 23, 2012).  See infra Part C. for discussion.
13. Compare Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851, 860 (Cal.
1997) (enumerating ten regulatory takings factors in addition to the three posited in 
Penn Central, and adding that “instead of applying these factors mechanically, check-
ing them off as it proceeds, a court should apply them as appropriate to the facts of 
the case it is considering.”).  
14. See, e.g., CCA Assocs., 667 F.3d 1239 (raising issues stated in text).
15. John E. Fee, The Takings Clause As A Comparative Right, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003,
1033 (2003). 
16. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988).
17. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 21 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). 
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basic needs of the indigent is a public function, and the generality exempts 
such levies from the purview of the Takings Clause.18 
Penn Central observed that, in Armstrong v. United States,19 the court “rec-
ognized that the ‘Fifth Amendment’s guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Gov-
ernment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in 
all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’”20  The 
Court subsequently enshrined this philosophy as the “Armstrong principle.”21 
Were the Constitution’s concern limited to “fairness and justice,” sub-
stantive due process might be the only protection that individuals require. 
Both the Contracts Clause22 and the Takings Clause23 might be rendered su-
perfluous, and we all could dwell happily in a restored Lochnerian world.24  
The suggestion in Penn Central that our concern is with “economic injuries”25 
belies the dignitary interests and political implications that underlie protec-
tion of contract26 and property.27  Furthermore, economic “injury” may be rec-
tified through tort law, although waiver of the United States’ sovereign im-
18. See generally, Eric Kades, Drawing the Line Between Taxes and Takings: the Continu-
ous Burden Principle, and Its Broader Application, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 189 (2002). 
19. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978) (citing
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
20. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123 (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49).
21. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
321 (2002). 
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“No State shall pass any . . . Law impairing the Ob-
ligation of Contracts . . ..”) 
23. U.S. CONST. amend V. (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation”). 
24. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating labor regulation un-
der economic substantive due process).  For a general critique of Penn Central as a 
substantive due process test, see Steven J. Eagle, Property Tests, Due Process Tests and 
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 988. 
25. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (“this Court, quite simply, has been unable to
develop any ‘set formula’ for determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require that eco-
nomic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than 
remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.”  (emphasis added). 
26. See SIR HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 100 (J. M. Dent & Sons 1972) (1861) (not-
ing that the “movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement 
from Status to Contract.”).  In feudal times, persons were not regarded as having 
equal innate dignity, and their respective rights were a function of their feudal status 
rather than their consensual bargain.  
27. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957
(1982) (explaining that individuals express and develop their sense of self through 
their interactions with their property). 
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munity from tort liability is a matter of grace.28  It is an important distinction 
that the United States possesses no such immunity from the obligation to 
pay just compensation for a taking.29  This issue was a subtext of the Su-
preme Court’s recent decision in Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. United 
States,30 where the Court held that damage resulting from recurrent, but not 
inevitable, federal flooding of Commission lands could constitute a taking, 
as opposed to a tort. 
Respect for private property was an integral part of the English and co-
lonial notion of liberty that was the backdrop of the United States Constitu-
tion.31  Private property insulates owners from dependence on State largess. 
The possibility that a sovereign could deprive citizens of property without 
compensation would lead to their demoralization and lack of independence. 
Those considerations underlay President John Adams’s proclamation: “Prop-
erty must be secured, or liberty cannot exist.”32 
The Fifth Amendment provides “nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”33  The Amendment refers to “proper-
ty” and not to “owners.”  Nor does the text mention unfairness in connection 
with the burdens that owners might incur.  This distinction is important in 
understanding the function of the “economic impact” test. 
28. See, e.g. United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814 (1976) (holding action
against United States impossible without express government waiver of immunity). 
29. See United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) (holding that a land-
owner is entitled to bring an action for inverse condemnation “as a result of ‘the self-
executing character of the constitutional provision with respect to 
compensation . . . .’” (quoting 6 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 25.41 (3d rev. ed. 
1972)). 
30. Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 511 (2012).
31. See generally, Steven J. Eagle, The Development of Property Rights in America and
the Property Rights Movement, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77 (2002).  See also PAULINE MAIER,
AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, 87 (1st ed. 1997) 
(noting the prevalence of “‘Lockean’ ideals”). 
32. 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 280 (Charles Francis Adams ed. 1850), quoted
in JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 388 (1st ed. 1996).  See gen-
erally, Steven J. Eagle, The Development of Property Rights in America and the Property Rights 
Movement, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77 (2002). 
33. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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B. Impact “on the Claimant”
Why does the first Penn Central factor refer to impact of the regulation 
“on the claimant”?34  Taken literally, it might refer to the effect of the action 
on all of the claimant’s property.  Instead, the Court always has referred to 
the impact on claimant’s relevant property, which Penn Central described as 
“the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a 
whole.”35  This exercise, of course, requires a determination of what the “par-
cel as a whole” actually is.  The answer to this ostensibly simple question is 
not apparent, despite the growth of a cottage industry of judicial and aca-
demic scholarship devoted to it.36 
Thus, Penn Central considers “impact” not upon a right that the law 
would regard as “property,” nor upon “the claimant,” but rather on some hy-
brid that might be called “the claimant’s ownership.”37  The overall effect, 
drawing from Professor Fee, is that Penn Central’s impact-per-acre is a func-
tion of the number-of-ownerships-per-acre.  The smaller each holding, the 
more likely it is that a regulation significantly affecting a given area of land 
would be considered a taking.38  Fee concludes that “[t]his is fundamentally 
inconsistent with the classical idea of property as a fungible entitlement.”39 
34. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (refer-
ring to “[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant”). 
35. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31.
36. See, e.g., Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 412, 427-30
(2011) (noting, inter alia, that factors to be taken into account include the extent to 
which an owner’s separately deeded parcels are contiguous, the dates on which such 
parcels were acquired, whether the owner employs them as a single economic unit, 
and whether sales of parts of an original parcel were precedent and unrelated to par-
ticular government restrictions at issue in the case); Dwight H. Merriam, Rules for the 
Relevant Parcel, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 353 (2003) (illustrating and explaining common “par-
cel as a whole’ complications); Steven J. Eagle, The Parcel and Then Some: Unity of Owner-
ship and the Parcel as a Whole, 36 VT. L. REV. 549, 597-600 (2012) (asserting that contigu-
ous parcels with no overlap of legal ownership cannot be aggregated under “parcel of 
a whole” simply because neighborly cooperation provides mutual enhancement of 
value). 
37. See infra Part C. (discussing Penn Central’s conflation of owner and owner-
ship and its reflection in confusion in applying the economic impact test). 
38. Fee, supra note 15, at 1033 (“[W]hen a single estate is partitioned and sub-
divided among numerous owners, the sum of private usage rights increases as the 
government’s power of regulation decreases; or, when an owner purchases and 
unites multiple estates into a single estate, the sum of private usage rights decreases 
as the government’s police power increases.”). 
39. Id. at 1033-34.
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Professor Echeverria did not disagree, although he added that, “on 
balance, the parcel rule helps produce fairer outcomes in takings cases.  The 
subjective losses experienced by property owners will vary depending upon 
the size of the owners’ holdings.”40  Thus, Armstrong’s call for “fairness and 
justice” might be deemed a right of landowners only in the aggregate.41  This 
is quite a distance from then-Justice Rehnquist’s observation in Penn Central 
that “[t]he Fifth Amendment does not allow simply an approximate compen-
sation but requires ‘a full and perfect equivalent for the property taken.’”42 
Somewhat incongruously, although the “parcel as a whole” produces 
more relative impact as parcels grow smaller, it is defended precisely be-
cause it might preclude that result.  Professor Margaret Radin’s term “con-
ceptual severance” often is invoked in this regard.43  While it is true an owner 
might claim a complete deprivation by cherry-picking a miniscule property 
right that is completely vitiated by the government’s action, the government 
also can play the game.  While “a taking can appear to emerge if the property 
is viewed too narrowly,” it is just as true that “[t]he effect of a taking can ob-
viously be disguised if the property at issue is too broadly defined.”44 
It would be much more straightforward if a taking simply could be re-
lated to “property;” but that would require an objective definition of the 
term.  Professor Fee has suggested that we consider whether a horizontal 
relevant parcel proposed by the claimant has “independent economic viabil-
ity.”45  I have suggested a “commercial unit” test, borrowing from Uniform 
Commercial Code § 2-608(1), under which the claimant could choose any 
unit of property as the relevant parcel but would have to establish that the 
selection is a unit used generally in real estate transactions in the area.46  
Neither approach has gained traction.47 
40. Echeverria, supra note 8, at 10475 n.37.
41. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
42. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 150 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 
312, 326 (1893)). 
43. Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Ju-
risprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1667 (1988). 
44. Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 318-19 (1991).
45. John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims,
61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535, 1557-62 (1994). 
46. STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS, § 7-7(e)(5) (5th ed. 2012).
47. See Daniel L. Siegel, How the History and Purpose of the Regulatory Takings Doc-
trine Help to Define the Parcel as a Whole, 36 VT. L. REV. 603, 613-15 (2012) (criticizing ap-
proaches). 
 West  Northwest, Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 2013 
415 
C. “Impact” and “Expectations” as Separate Penn Central
Factors
It now is conventional to think of the paragraph in Penn Central embod-
ying the enumerated factors48 as the Penn Central “test.”  However, “the opin-
ion did not give any indication that it viewed the paragraph . . . as a test, 
much less an outcome-determinative test, for assessing regulatory tak-
ings.”49 
More pointedly, to the extent that the Court in Penn Central iden-
tified discrete factors for consideration, it identified two, rather 
than three, such factors: (1) the impact of the challenged regula-
tion on the claimant, viewed in light of the claimant’s invest-
ment-backed expectations and (2) the character of the govern-
mental action, viewed in light of the principle that actions that 
closely resemble direct exercises of eminent domain are more 
likely to be compensable takings than are garden-variety land use 
regulations.  Someone who knew nothing of modern takings law 
would be, to say the least, hard pressed to distill a discrete three-
factor analysis from the opinion in Penn Central.50 
The ubiquitous structured discussion in takings cases, following the 
familiar three-factor track, is not a creature of Penn Central, but rather first 
appeared the following year, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States.51  Thus, it was Kai-
ser Aetna that first split economic impact from investment-backed expecta-
tions. 
There are substantial reasons for combining the “economic impact” 
and “distinct investment-backed expectations” factors.52  The Supreme Court 
should revisit the conceptual foundations of Penn Central in a comprehensive 
way.  More narrowly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit should 
48. See supra, note 1 and accompanying text (reproducing referenced para-
graph). 
49. Gary Lawson, Katharine Ferguson, and Guillermo A. Montero, “Oh Lord,
Please Don’t Let Me Be Misunderstood: Rediscovering the Matthews v. Eldridge and Penn Cen-
tral Frameworks, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 31-32 (2005). 
50. Id. at 32.
51. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
52. See infra Part 4. for discussion.
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reconsider en banc whether “impact” is to be measured primarily by value or 
by return on equity.53 
III. Measuring Economic Impact on the Claimant
Having previously focused on “the claimant,” this Article now turns to
those practical factors that can be used to measure the “impact” of a regula-
tion. 
It is useful at the outset to stress that many things that have economic 
value are not “property.”  A motel along an old U.S. highway might lose most 
value when a parallel interstate highway is built nearby, but the motel owner 
never possessed a legal right to have tired long-distance travelers pass his 
door.  For the same reason, a taking cannot be supported by loss of value 
alone.54  As the Federal Circuit has applied it, the determination of whether 
there is a regulatory taking is a two-step process.  “First, as a threshold mat-
ter, the court must determine whether the claimant has established a prop-
erty interest for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.”55  “Second, after having 
identified a valid property interest, the court must determine whether the 
governmental action at issue amounted to a compensable taking of that 
property interest.”56 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Penn Central contained statements 
suggesting the need to establish a quantum of economic impact that would 
augur in favor of a taking. 
We now must consider whether the interference with appellants’ 
property is of such a magnitude that “there must be an exercise 
of eminent domain and compensation to sustain [it].”  That in-
quiry may be narrowed to the question of the severity of the im-
pact of the law on appellants’ parcel, and its resolution in turn 
requires a careful assessment of the impact of the regulation on 
the Terminal site.57 
53. See supra Part B. for discussion. The Federal Circuit applies the rule that
earlier decisions prevail unless overruled en banc. USPPS, Ltd. v. Avery Dennison 
Corp., 676 F.3d 1341, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
54. See Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508
U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (“[M]ere diminution in the value of property, however serious, is 
insufficient to demonstrate a taking.”). 
55. Air Pegasus of D.C., Inc. v. U.S., 424 F.3d 1206, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting
Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1372 (Fed.Cir.2004), cert. de-
nied, 545 U.S. 1139 (2005). 
56. Id. at 1213 (quoting Am Pelagic, 379 F.3d at 1372).
57. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978) (quoting
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)). 
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However, as then-Justice Rehnquist pointed out in a footnote, the ma-
jority’s economic terminology was problematic. 
Difficult conceptual and legal problems are posed by a rule that a 
taking only occurs where the property owner is denied all rea-
sonable return on his property.  Not only must the Court define 
“reasonable return” for a variety of types of property (farmlands, 
residential properties, commercial and industrial areas), but the 
Court must define the particular property unit that should be ex-
amined. . . .  The Court does little to resolve these questions in 
its opinion.  Thus, at one point, the Court implies that the ques-
tion is whether the restrictions have “an unduly harsh impact up-
on the owner’s use of the property,” ante, at [127]; at another 
point, the question is phrased as whether Penn Central can ob-
tain “a ‘reasonable return’ on its investment,” ante, at [136]; and, 
at yet another point, the question becomes whether the land-
mark is “economically viable,” ante, at [138] n. 36.58 
As land economist William Wade observed, “[t]he footnote appears to 
point out politely that the majority was not schooled in the meanings of the 
economic terms used in their language.”59  Importantly, Wade concludes that 
Penn Central conflated factors concerning diminution of the value of the par-
cel resulting from regulation and factors relating to whether the cash flow 
generated by the parcel after regulation were so diminished as to make the 
use of the parcel not a viable investment.60  
A. General Methodology
1. Methods for Valuing Takings Losses
Where a taking is permanent and complete, all connection between 
the former owner and the condemned interest in land is terminated.  If the 
interest taken were a fee simple, the basic measure of damages would be the 
fair market value of the fee at the effective date of the taking.  If the interest 
taken were less than a fee simple, the measure of damages would be the fair 
market value of that interest.  Given the thin or nonexistent market for such 
interests, however, the “with and without” method is generally employed. 
The fair market value of the owner’s interest, subject to the government’s 
58. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 149 n.13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
59. William W. Wade, Sources of Regulatory Takings Economic Confusion Subsequent to
Penn Central, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10936, 10937 n. 11 (2011). 
60. Id.
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rights, is subtracted from the fair market value of the owner’s interest prior 
to the taking.  Where there are no suitable comparable parcels, appraisers 
use capitalized income to value commercial parcels, and replacement costs 
to value unique noncommercial structures, such as some houses of worship. 
2. Treatment of Severance Damages and Government
Benefits
In addition to just compensation for that part of a parcel that is taken, 
owners are entitled to damages for harm done to their remaining property.61  
Especially where they own adjoining parcels with complementary uses, 
owners may receive “severance damages” for injury to their remaining land. 
“General benefits” from a project involving condemnation are conferred on 
the general public in the vicinity.  On the other hand, “special benefits” are 
conferred on the condemnee.  For example, if a transit station is built on 
condemned land next to the condemnee’s office building, the condemnee 
likely would have received a special benefit.  Members of the public walking 
to the station from some blocks away would receive only a general benefit. 
Where severance damages are not claimed by the owner, evi-
dence of benefits to the remainder is not admissible. Since bene-
fits are raised as a defense to severance damages, it logically fol-
lows that damages must first be claimed before evidence of 
benefits can be offered.  The condemning authority has the bur-
den of proving that its project resulted in a measurable benefit to 
the owner’s remaining land.  To meet this burden, the govern-
ment must offer proof that the increase in value of condemnee’s 
remainder resulted directly and peculiarly from the public im-
provement, over and above that appreciation in value enjoyed by 
neighboring property.62 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that offsetting benefits against sev-
erance damages is constitutional, but that the offset is limited to special 
benefits.63  According to the leading eminent domain treatise: 
Arguably, the setoff of general benefits denies the condemnee 
the constitutional guarantee of just compensation since the 
61. See generally, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, § 8A.02.
62. NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, § 8A.02 [5] (citations omitted).
63. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897) (“When, on the other hand, the
part which he retains is specially and directly increased in value by the public improve-
ment, the damages to the whole parcel by the appropriation of part of it are less-
ened”) (emphasis added). 
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condemnee is singled out and deprived of a share in the in-
creased prosperity of his or her fellow citizens merely because 
the public happens to want a portion of the condemnee’s land. 
The condemnee pays in taxation for his or her share of general 
benefits, just as other members of the public, and therefore, is 
entitled to receive his/her fair portion of the general advantages 
brought about by a public improvement.  Nevertheless, a minori-
ty of states permit both special and general benefits to offset 
severance damages.64 
The principles of eminent domain also bear upon the nature of, and 
burden to establish, offsetting benefits that might ameliorate the impact of 
regulations in regulatory takings cases.65  They explain why offsets from eco-
nomic impacts resulting from regulations are limited to provisions estab-
lishing benefits in the regulations themselves, and not benefits contained in 
the general law.66 
Where a taking is temporary, the matter is more complex.  Unfortu-
nately, “commentators and courts alike have been unable to agree on a con-
sistent measure of compensation for temporary regulatory takings and have 
instead adopted a wide range of formulations.”67  As Daniel Siegel and Rob-
ert Meltz have explained, whether there is a taking often depends on “(a) 
whether the Court deems the imposition physical, as opposed to a use re-
striction; (b) if physical, whether the Court considers the imposition to be 
temporary or permanent; and (c) if physical and temporary, whether the im-
position is seen as partial or total.”68 
This Article deals with these issues in the context of calculating the 
impact of temporary regulations recently litigated in the Federal Circuit’s 
Cienega Gardens69 and CCA Associates70 lines of cases.71 
64. NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, § 8A.02 [6] (citing Brand v. Union Elevated R.
Co., 238 U.S. 586 (1915).  “[A]lthough the majority of the Court failed to reach the 
constitutional question, four of the justices supported the opinion that setting off 
general benefits denied the owner just compensation and was a violation of due pro-
cess.”)  Id. 
65. See infra Part C. for discussion.
66. See infra Part C. (discussing offsetting benefits in economic impact cases).
67. Daniel L. Siegel & Robert Meltz, Temporary Takings: Settled Principles and Unre-
solved Questions, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 479, 512, 496-499 (2010) (citing cases employing 
term). 
68. Id. at 481.
69. See Cienega Gardens v. United States, 503 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(Cienega X). 
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3. “With and Without” Approach
It is difficult to measure the value of government restrictions directly, 
since there is no market for them.  The usual approach to determine the im-
pact of the regulation subtracts the value of a parcel with the regulation in 
place from the value of the parcel without the regulation.  
Professor Echeverria cited, as a defect of the “with and without” ap-
proach, that its “one-sided arithmetic grants a claimant credit for the nega-
tive effects of regulatory restrictions while giving the public no credit for the 
positive effects of regulation on the claimant’s property due to the re-
strictions on neighboring properties.”72  However, this analysis gives insuffi-
cient credit to the concept of “reciprocity of advantage.”  Justice Holmes, in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,73 most famously used the term.  The dissent of 
then-Justice Rehnquist in Penn Central was based, in part, on the lack of reci-
procity between the few parcels that were burdened and the multitude that 
were not.74  Using reciprocity of advantage, even a stringent burden placed 
on one property owner might be offset by the advantages of like burdens be-
ing imposed on neighbors.  Even if there is a taking in theory, the implicit 
answer is that there is compensation in kind.  The Supreme Court’s uphold-
ing of a strict regulation affecting the French Quarter of New Orleans was 
based on just such reciprocity among Quarter merchants and the City’s tour-
ist industry, generally.75  Reciprocity of advantage has been a recurrent 
theme in Professor Richard Epstein’s work.76 
In addition, the opportunistic owner posited by Professor Echeverria is 
unlikely to launch a facial challenge to the offending regulation, since a suc-
cessful challenge means relieving neighbors of the burden, leaving the 
plaintiff bereft of special advantage.  In any event, litigating would be an 
“uphill battle.”77  An “as applied” facial challenge is almost certain to falter 
70. See CCA Assocs. v. United States, 667 F.3d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
129 S.Ct. 1313 (Feb. 23, 2012). 
71. See infra Part B. for discussion.
72. Echeverria, supra note 8, at 10475.
73. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
74. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 139-140 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
75. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
76. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, An Outline of Takings, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 3, 11
(1986) (“Some takings can be justified by the police power; and for others implicit in- 
kind compensation (e.g., the benefit of regulation or taxes) may be provided to the 
persons whose property is taken, whether in whole or in part, so that the constitu-
tional standard of just compensation is in fact met”). 
77. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987).
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where the neighbors are similarly regulated.  Also, if one owner wins such a 
challenge, others will as well, with the probable outcome that the neighbor-
hood is rezoned. 
4. Regulated Value Minus Investment
Another method for determining the impact of a regulation is the rela-
tionship between a claimant’s investment (for tax purposes, referred to as 
“cost basis”) in the property, and the value of the property as restricted.  The 
Court of Federal Claims used this method in Walcek v. United States,78 where it 
said that “[t]he comparative value of the Property before and after the regu-
latory imposition is not the sole indicia of the economic impact of the regu-
lation.”79  The Court there cited a Federal Circuit opinion, Florida Rock Indus-
tries,80 for the proposition that, in assessing the severity of the economic im-
impact of the regulations, “the owner’s opportunity to recoup its investment 
or better, subject to the regulation, cannot be ignored.”81 
It is possible that the Florida Rock quotation overstated the Federal Cir-
cuit’s mandate. Florida Rock found that the trial court had erred in some of its 
factual and legal determinations, and, at the end of the “conclusions” sec-
tion of its opinion, provided the trial judge with some general instructions. 
On remand, the court should consider, along with other relevant 
matters, the relationship of the owner’s basis or investment, and 
the fair market value before the alleged taking, to the fair market 
value after the alleged taking.  In determining the severity of eco-
nomic impact, the owner’s opportunity to recoup its investment 
or better, subject to the regulation, cannot be ignored.82 
Professor Echeverria stated: “When a property owner can at least re-
cover his cost basis in the property, a takings claim should arguably be re-
jected regardless of what the with-and-without approach might show.”83  
This statement seems problematic.  The problem involves more than untan-
gling the complexities of inflation and the general effects of government 
regulation on land prices in the area, which Echeverria noted.84  More perva-
78. Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248 (Fed. Cl. 2001), aff’d, 303 F.3d 1349
(Fed. Cir. 2002). 
79. Id. at 266.
80. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 905 (Fed.Cir.1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053, 107 S.Ct. 926, 93 L.Ed.2d 978 (1987). 
81. Walcek, 49 Fed. Cl. at 266 (quoting Florida Rock Indus., 791 F.2d at 905).
82. Florida Rock, 791 F.2d at 905.
83. Echeverria, supra note 8, at 10475.
84. Id.
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sively, the owner’s very hard or astute work would not be captured in cost 
basis.  Neither would a dramatic increase in land values in the area occa-
sioned by factors such as its becoming a trendy tourist destination, the cen-
ter of a dynamic new industry, or the scene of newly discovered mineral 
wealth.  In any such situation, the owner might be able to produce compel-
ling evidence that regulation had diminished the value of the specific parcel, 
although it was still comfortably above cost basis. 
Finally, just as the denominator of “parcel as a whole” gives undue lev-
erage to the effects of regulation on impact as parcels grow smaller,85 the 
presence or absence of factors affecting cost basis, such as accelerated tax 
depreciation, similarly leverage impact under a regulated-value-minus-
investment approach.  Thus, were the recoupment of cost basis the determi-
nant of impact, a regulation might not have severe impact if the claimant 
used specialized facilities, but might if it utilized raw land.  While recoup-
ment of the owner’s investment is a useful concept, it should not be out-
come determinative. 
5. Loss of Profitability
Another measure of the impact of a regulation is the loss of business 
profits that results from it.  This was a factor analyzed by the Federal Circuit 
in Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States,86 where the claim was based on strict 
government restrictions on egg sales, imposed after the farms tested posi-
tive for the presence of salmonella bacteria.  The plaintiffs asserted that the 
restrictions substantially lowered earnings and thus constituted a taking. 
The court “reject[ed] the government’s contention that a returns-based anal-
ysis is per se less suitable than one based on diminution in value in the pre-
sent case.”87  The Court of Federal Claims’ decision in Walcek v. United States 
also makes clear that profit is an impact factor.88 
On this point, it is instructive that Penn Central itself described the peti-
tioner’s loss in terms of income and profitability.  The Court stated that “the 
appellants had failed to show that they could not earn a reasonable return 
on their investment in the Terminal itself . . . even if the Terminal proper 
could never operate at a reasonable profit . . . .”89  
85. See supra notes 38-39 and associated text for discussion.
86. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 373 F.3d 1177 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
87. Id. at 1188.
88. Walcek, 49 Fed. Cl. at 266-67.
89. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 121.
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B. Federal Circuit Adopts, Then Abandons, “Return on
Equity” Impact Analysis
In First English,90 the Supreme Court ruled that states had to provide a 
compensation remedy for temporary takings, and that mere invalidation of 
the offending regulation was insufficient.  Subsequently, in Tahoe-Sierra,91 the 
Court ruled that the claimants’ losses could not be measured with respect to 
the period that the prohibition on use was in effect, but rather had to be 
measured with respect to their fee simple interests, and not with respect to 
the term of years carved out by the government.92  Justice Stevens explained 
this rejection of temporal segmentation as an application of the “parcel as a 
whole” rule the Court enunciated in Penn Central.93  In two recent lines of cas-
es culminating in Cienega Gardens v. United States (Cienega X),94 and CCA Associ-
ates v. United States,95 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit inter-
preted Tahoe-Sierra to preclude the use of “return on equity” analysis to 
determine the impact of a regulation on takings claimants.  Instead, the 
Federal Circuit will consider the effects of temporary regulatory takings only 
as they affect the value of the claimants’ fee interests.  
1. Background of Housing Preservation Acts
The background of the housing preservation acts that gave rise to the 
Cienega and CCA Associates cases is summarized in Cienega X.96  In 1934, Con-
gress enacted the National Housing Act97 to enhance the Nation’s stock of 
affordable housing.  During the 1960s, it augmented its subsidies for local 
public housing authorities by providing incentives for investors to provide 
additional low-income housing.98  The government “provided below-market-
rate mortgages.”99  “The mortgage contracts were for forty-year mortgages 
and included an option to prepay the mortgage without HUD approval after 
90. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
91. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302 (2002). 
92. Id. at 331-32.
93. Id. at 332.
94. Cienega Gardens v. United States, 503 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Cienega X). 
95. CCA Assocs. v. United States, 667 F.3d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 129
S.Ct. 1313 (Feb. 23, 2012).
96. Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1270-73.
97. Pub.L. No. 73–479, § 1, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934).
98. Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1270.
99. Id.
 West  Northwest, Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 2013 
424 
twenty years.  The regulations under the statute were consistent with these 
contracts, including providing for prepayment without HUD approval after 
twenty years.”100  Congress further authorized FHA insurance to protect lend-
ers against default, provided for a HUD contribution towards the owner’s 
down payment, and provided tax benefits for investors.101 
In return, HUD would oversee and restrict operation of the housing 
units, including important management decisions and increases in rent.102  
The owners’ annual return on their equity investments would be limited to 
six percent of their initial equity investment.103  “The restrictions of the regu-
latory agreements were effective for as long as HUD insured the mortgage on 
the property, i.e., until the mortgage was paid off.  The exercise of the pre-
payment right under the mortgage agreement with the mortgage lender 
would thus have the effect of terminating the regulatory agreement.”104  
Thus, “[p]repayment removed regulatory restrictions and allowed participa-
tion in the conventional housing market.”105  However: 
In the 1980s, Congress became concerned that as prepayment 
dates arrived the limited partnerships would prepay the mort-
gages; that the restrictions imposed during the mortgage period 
would expire; and that the housing stock represented by these 
projects would be withdrawn from the low-income market and 
converted to traditional apartment units, rented at market 
rates.106 
As a result, Congress enacted the Emergency Low Income Housing 
Preservation Act of 1987 (ELIHPA) in 1988107 (a temporary measure), and the 
Low-Income Housing Preservation and Resident Homeownership Act of 
1990108 (LIHPRHA) in 1990 (initially planned as permanent).  Both of these 
measures were designed, as a Congressional report put it, “to ‘balance the 
public policy need to preserve housing for low income families with the per-
ceived contractual rights of the owners.’’109  Under LIHPRHA, most pertinent 
to the cases discussed,  
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1271.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. CCA Assocs. v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 580, 585 (2010).
106. Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1272.
107. Pub.L. No. 100–242, § 202, 101 Stat. 1877 (1988).
108. Pub.L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4249 (1990).
109. Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1272 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101-559, at 75 (1990).
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Congress restricted the rights of owners by requiring them as a 
condition of exiting the program to offer their property for sale to 
owners that would preserve the rent restrictions and barring the 
owners from exiting the programs (by effectively barring prepay-
ment of the mortgages) while the properties were offered for 
sale.110 
However, Congress subsequently restored prepayment rights, effective 
April 29, 1996.111  This did not affect takings cases that previously had been 
filed.  Additionally, the Federal Circuit had ruled earlier that HUD was not in 
breach of a duty to accept prepayment because, technically, HUD and the 
borrowers were not in privity of contract.112 
Both the Cienega and CCA Associates cases were filed by claimants who 
asserted that the five-year suspension of their rights to prepay their mort-
gages, and thus escape the onerous requirements of low-income housing 
obligations, constituted temporary regulatory takings.  
2. Temporary Takings in Light of “Parcel as a Whole”
The decisions in Cienega X113 and CCA Associates114 raise fundamental 
questions about the meaning, or even existence, of the “temporary taking.” 
At the outset, it is not clear whether even a physical invasion and ouster that 
subsequently is terminated by the government entity can constitute a tem-
porary taking.115  In Seiber v. United States,116 the owner contended that a two-
year prohibition on economically viable use constituted a taking under the 
per se rule of Lucas.117  The government argued that this result was precluded 
by Tahoe-Sierra, since “there is no such legal category as a temporary categor-
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1274 (citing the Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of
1996, Pub.L. No. 104-120, 110 Stat. 834 (1996) (“HOPE”). 
112. Id. (citing Cienega Gardens v. United States, 194 F.3d 1231, 1234, 1246
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (Cienega IV).  While bound by this precedent, the Court of Federal 
Claims spoke disparagingly of it, noting “there is no doubt that the government, by 
providing the forms for the documents that were executed in this case, intended to 
provide the basis for a single, integrated transaction.”  CCA Assocs. v. United States, 91 
Fed. Cl. 580, 592 (2010). 
113. Cienega X, 503 F.3d 1266.
114. CCA Assocs. v. United States, 667 F.3d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 1313 (Feb. 23, 2012). 
115. See generally, Siegel & Meltz, supra note 67, at 496-99.
116. Seiber v. United States, 364 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
117. Id.
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ical taking because by its very nature a temporary taking allows a property 
owner to recoup some measure of its property’s value.”118  The Federal Cir-
cuit did not address the issue, but observed that one of its earlier cases had 
“explained that the Supreme Court may have only ‘rejected [the] application 
of the per se rule articulated in Lucas to temporary development moratoria,’ 
and not to temporary takings that result from the rescission of a permit re-
quirement or denial.”119 
In its initial decision in CCA Associates in 2007,120 the Court of Federal 
Claims restated the three different methods that courts had used to meas-
ure the economic impact of a regulation on the claimant.  The first involved 
the change in fair market value due to the regulation.121  The second measure 
looked to the “claimant’s ability to recoup its capital.”122  The final method 
the court utilized “examines a claimant’s return on equity under a given reg-
ulatory regime in comparison to the return on equity that would be received 
but for the alleged taking.”123 
The 2007 Claims Court opinion noted that the Federal Circuit, when 
faced with temporary takings claims “similar in all respects to that at issue 
here,” took the same return-on-equity approach.124 
In Cienega VIII, the Court of Appeals compared the annual rate of 
return on the owners’ real equity in their properties to the 8.5 
percent return on “low-risk Fannie Mae bonds.”  This approach 
“best measures the impact of ELIHPA and LIHPRHA on” the 
owners of Section 221(d)(3) properties because the alleged tak-
ing involves lost streams of income at an operating property, not 
the physical transfer of a piece of undeveloped property to the 
government and the subsequent return of that property to the 
owner.  As the Federal Circuit explained: 
The Owners’ theory of recovery is not that their fee simple estates 
were taken or their land rendered “valueless.”  The Owners’ enti-
tlement to compensation is based on the taking of the real prop-
118. Id.
119. Id. (quoting Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1350-52
(Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
120. CCA Assocs. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 170 (2007).
121. Id. at 195 (citing, e.g., Maritrans v. United States, 342 F.3d 1344 at 1358
(Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
122. Id. (citing Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 247 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
123. Id. (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 129 (“capable of earning a reasonable
return”)). 
124. Id.
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erty interests reflected in the mortgage loan notes and the Regu-
latory Agreements.  The difference is that the Owners’ loss of the 
contractual prepayment rights was both total and immediate. 
They were barred from the unregulated rental market and other 
more lucrative property uses.125 
However, Cienega X subsequently rejected the return-on-equity ap-
proach, declaring that the Supreme Court “has made clear that in the regula-
tory takings context the loss in value of the adversely affected property in-
terest cannot be considered in isolation.”126  The court noted that the 
Supreme Court had stated that separate consideration of the airspace sub-
ject to restrictions in Penn Central was “quite simply untenable,” and that 
“‘[t]aking jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete seg-
ments . . .”127  Turning to the temporal application of the Penn Central “parcel 
as a whole” rule, Cienega X stated that “[i]n Tahoe-Sierra, the necessity of con-
sidering of the overall value [sic] of the property was explicitly confirmed in 
the temporary regulatory takings context.”128 
Furthermore, Cienega X added, the return-on-equity approach in tem-
porary regulatory takings cases could not be justified by such temporary 
physical appropriation cases as Kimble Laundry Co. v. United States, where the 
Court held that just compensation was “the rental that probably could have 
been obtained.”129  The Federal Circuit noted that Kimble Laundry used return-
on-equity to measure just compensation, not to find a taking, and that Tahoe-
Sierra deemed it “inappropriate” to treat physical takings cases as “control-
ling precedents” for regulatory takings claims.130  The justification for the Ta-
hoe-Sierra “inappropriate” language is that  
Land-use regulations are ubiquitous and most of them impact 
property values in some tangential way—often in completely un-
anticipated ways.  Treating them all as per se takings would trans-
form government regulation into a luxury few governments could 
afford.  By contrast, physical appropriations are relatively rare, 
125. Id. at 195-96 (quoting Cienega VIII, 331 F.3d at 1344).
126. Cienega Gardens v. United States, 503 F.3d 1266, 1280 (Cienega X) (citing,
e.g. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Tahoe-Sierra
Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)).
127. Id. (quoting Penn Central, Tahoe-Sierra).
128. Id. at 1281 (citing Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331).
129. Id. at 1281 (quoting Kimble Laundry, 338 U.S. 1, 7 (1949)).
130. Id. at 1281-82 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 323).
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easily identified, and usually represent a greater affront to indi-
vidual property rights.131 
These distinctions might augur for a presumption of “inappropriate-
ness” in many cases, perhaps most.  However, they hardly seem to justify an 
absolute rule precluding return-on-equity as the proper measure of the “im-
pact” factor in takings determinations. 
The Federal Circuit vacated the Court of Federal Claims’ 2007 decision 
in CCA Associates and remanded in light of the fact that the decision was 
premised on Cienega VIII’s approval of return-on-equity analysis of temporary 
regulatory takings cases, subsequently repudiated in Cienega X.132  In its sub-
sequent 2010 opinion in CCA Associates,133 the Claims Court undertook to de-
termine the economic impact of the regulation with respect to CCA Associ-
ates’ entire ownership.  Cienega X “proposed two possible ways ‘to compare 
the value of the restriction to the value of the property as a whole.’”134  
First, a comparison could be made between the market value of 
the property with and without the restrictions on the date that 
the restriction began (the change in value approach).  The other 
approach is to compare the lost net income due to the restriction 
(discounted to present value at the date the restriction was im-
posed) with the total net income without the restriction over the 
entire useful life of the property (again discounted to present 
value).135 
Evidence was not presented on the discounted lost income approach, 
so the court employed the change in value approach.  It determined, pursu-
ant to a joint stipulation by the parties, that, using the methodology of 
Cienega X, there was an economic impact of 18 percent as a result of the 
Preservation Statutes, not considering statutory benefits conferred by the 
statutes.136  The Claims Court’s 2007 opinion, premised on the Cienega VIII 
standard, found a corresponding economic impact of 81.25 percent during 
the five-year period when the prepayment prohibition was in effect.137  On 
appeal, the Federal Circuit stated: 
131. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 324.
132. CCA Assocs. v. United States, 284 Fed. Appx. 810, 811 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
133. CCA Assocs. v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 580 (2010).
134. Id. at 612 (quoting Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1282).
135. Id. (quoting Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1282).
136. Id. at 612-13.
137. CCA Assocs. v. United States, 667 F.3d 1239, 1245-46 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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In light of the facts of this case, we cannot conclude that an 18% 
economic impact qualifies as sufficiently substantial to favor a 
taking.  Because we are bound by the economic impact method-
ology of Cienega X, we must conclude that the Court of Federal 
Claims erred when it held that this factor supported a taking.138 
The court pointedly noted that, while it was “bound by the law” of 
Cienega X,139 “Cienega X makes it virtually impossible for any ELIHPA or 
LIHPRHA plaintiff to establish the severe economic impact necessary for a 
takings.140 
3. Cienega X Could Hasten the Demise of Temporary Takings
The Supreme Court’s Tahoe-Sierra decision treated extended develop-
ment moratoria as an opportunity to impose the “parcel as a whole” frame-
work on “the temporal aspect of the owner’s interest.”141 
An interest in real property is defined by the metes and bounds 
that describe its geographic dimensions and the term of years 
that describes the temporal aspect of the owner’s interest.  Both 
dimensions must be considered if the interest is to be viewed in 
its entirety.  Hence, a permanent deprivation of the owner’s use 
of the entire area is a taking of “the parcel as a whole,” whereas a 
temporary restriction that merely causes a diminution in value is 
not.  Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless 
by a temporary prohibition on economic use, because the property 
will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted.142 
This statement is both doctrinally anomalous and economically unin-
formed.  It contradicts the gravamen of the Supreme Court’s First English 
holding, which, although providing for a remedy only, necessarily is predi-
cated on the existence of compensable temporary takings.143  It also suggests 
138. Id. at 1246.
139. Id. at 1244 (quoting Hometown Financial, Inc. v. United States, 409 F.3d
1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[W]e are bound to follow our own precedent as set forth 
by prior panels.”).  
140. Id. at 1246.
141. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
331-32 (2002).
142. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331-32 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
143. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
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that lost economic value could be restored through the miracle of com-
pound interest. 
In First English, the Court held that the Just Compensation Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment requires that a landowner be allowed to recover damages 
during the time that a taking is in effect.144  The type of taking under consid-
eration in First English, sometimes called a “retrospectively temporary tak-
ing,”145 refers to a regulation intended to be permanent, but which retrospec-
tively is truncated after a court finds a taking or the regulator is faced with a 
lawsuit that might plausibly be successful or some other undesirable out-
come.  It is difficult to understand why, having consummated an inverse 
condemnation of an interest in land, the condemnor should be free to un-
wind its actions.  The inverse condemnee seeking damages presumably has 
relied, albeit unhappily, on the government’s action subsequently deter-
mined to constitute a taking being final.  
According to First English, “[o]nce a court determines that a taking has 
occurred, the government retains the whole range of options already availa-
ble—amendment of the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, 
or exercise of eminent domain.”146  But there is nothing “invalid” about the 
regulation from a takings perspective,147 although it might be arbitrary or 
otherwise violative of due process.148  Nor is it clear why government “re-
tains” the right to a “do over,” to replace a choice that validly constrains the 
actions or possessions of citizens, though under the rubric of a taking for the 
public good rather than a police power device to prevent harm.  When the 
former owners have rearranged their lives and finances in light of the con-
demnation of their property, it surely might be said that they have formed 
new “investment-backed expectations.”  I have suggested elsewhere that it 
would be better to view the municipality’s retrospective choice not as an es-
144. Id. at 319 (“Where this burden results from governmental action that
amounted to a taking, the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment re-
quires that the government pay the landowner for the value of the use of the land 
during this period.”). 
145. See Siegel & Meltz, supra note 67, at 496-97.
146. First English, 482 U.S. at 321.
147. See Id. 315 (noting the Fifth Amendment “is designed not to limit the gov-
ernmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in 
the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking”).  
148. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. at 531-32 (2005) (holding “substan-
tially advance legitimate state interests” language of Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 
U.S. 255, 260 (1980) not a valid takings test, but rather a due process test. 544 U.S. at 
540.
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cape hatch from a taking, but rather as a taking coupled with a “put option” 
to retransfer the interest to the inverse condemnee.149 
The anomaly driving the Federal Circuit’s decision in Cienega X150 is that 
it takes Penn Central’s “parcel as a whole” doctrine,151 adds to it the Tahoe-
Sierra inclusion in that doctrine of “temporal segmentation,” and applies 
them in such a way as to vitiate the First English holding that temporary tak-
ings do exist, and under the Constitution require just compensation. 
Cienega X accomplishes this by holding that the economic impact of a 
temporary taking should be calculated by its effect on the claimant’s “parcel 
as a whole,” which is to say, all of the claimant’s ownership.  By judging the 
economic impact of temporary regulations and permanent regulations on a 
unitary scale, Cienega X means that, in order to prevail on the “economic im-
pact” test of Penn Central for a temporary regulation, the claimant would also 
have to prevail if the regulation were permanent. 
There is no need for the Federal Circuit to take such a dogmatic posi-
tion.  While “parcel as a whole” seems clear at first blush, it requires, and 
has received, much interpretation.152  For instance, in Lost Tree Village Corp. v. 
United States,153 the government objected to parts of the claimant’s original 
parcel that were being sold excluded from the “parcel as a whole.”  The court 
responded:  
[F]acts regarding the progression and status of development plus
sale of potentially-related properties are aspects of property
ownership that reflect manifestations of a property owner’s use
and projected use of property.  If the particular circumstances
and realities of usage indicate that temporal considerations are
salient, then temporality has to be taken into account in deter-
mining the “parcel as a whole.”154
The Claims Court added: “Quite simply, there are very few per se rules in 
regulatory takings cases.”155 
149. See Steven J. Eagle, Just Compensation for Permanent Takings of Temporal Inter-
ests, 10 FED.  CIR. B.J. 485-511 (2001). 
150. Cienega Gardens v. United States, 503 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Cienega X). 
151. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131.
152. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
153. Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 412 (2011).  It should be
noted that the author, Judge Charles F. Lettow, also wrote the Claims Court’s opin-
ions in the CCA Associates cases. 
154. Id. at 430.
155. Id. at 430 n.28 (citing Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322).
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Under the same reasoning, if it is persuasive that the shorter time 
horizon and cash-flow imperatives of housing investors make the termina-
tions of their investments prior to the expiration of the natural life of the 
apartment buildings imperative, there is no absolute barrier in “parcel as a 
whole” that should preclude that outcome. 
Also, what could Justice Stevens have meant when he wrote in Tahoe-
Sierra that “a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary 
prohibition on economic use, because the property will recover value as 
soon as the prohibition is lifted”?156  A landowner is no more made whole by 
such “lifting” than is a person suffering from a debilitating disease made 
whole by a cure many decades later.  A landlord who is compelled to receive 
below-market rents today will not, for that reason, receive above-market 
rents in the future.  A person who was deprived of most of her capital today 
and prudently invests the remainder might have a sum “lifted” to the original 
capital many years later, but that does not equate to the individual’s wealth 
if the entire sum was originally available for investment. 
The foregoing are illustrations of what, in finance, is known as the 
“time value of money.”  Sums of money can only meaningfully be compared 
across time if they are discounted by an interest factor to the same date. 
The better way of explaining Justice Stevens’ comment is that it is true that a 
dollar at some point in the distant future is not “worthless” today; it merely 
has a miniscule value.  The value would be small enough either to pass mus-
ter under Lucas, or to be a “severe” diminution under the Penn Central impact 
test. 
The inconsistence between First English and Tahoe-Sierra is both suffi-
ciently fundamental and apparent as to lend strength to Judge Alex 
Kozinski’s suggestion that the latter decision was intended to undermine the 
former.  In his dissent from the Ninth Circuit’s denial of the petition for re-
hearing of Tahoe-Sierra en banc,157 Kozinski noted 
Justice Stevens dissented from First English because he disagreed 
with the Court’s “conclu[sion] that all ordinances which would 
constitute takings if allowed to remain in effect permanently, 
necessarily also constitute takings if they are in effect for only a 
limited period of time.”  Justice Stevens would have held that a 
temporary regulation cannot be a taking, even though it deprives 
the owner of all present uses, because the property retains value 
based upon its future uses.  That reasoning, embraced by no oth-
er member of the Supreme Court, is adopted by the panel in this 
156. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l. Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 332 (2002). 
157. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 228 F.3d
998 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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case.  While the opinion nowhere cites Justice Stevens’ First Eng-
lish dissent, the reasoning-and even the wording-bear an uncanny 
resemblance.158 
When Tahoe-Sierra reached the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens lavishly 
quoted Judge Reinhardt’s Ninth Circuit panel opinion, and left unacknowl-
edged that Reinhardt had closely paraphrased his own First English dissent. 
4. Combining “Impact” and “Expectations”
As noted earlier,159 the three-factor regulatory takings test did not arise 
full-blown in Penn Central, but rather emerged from subsequent Supreme 
Court efforts to build a logical structure from Penn Central’s nebulous founda-
tion.160  Those approaching Penn Central for the first time almost invariably 
believe that the “distinct investment-backed expectations” test is but a sub-
set of the “economic impact on the claimant” test.161  A combined test, along 
the lines of “impact of the challenged regulation on the claimant, viewed in 
light of the claimant’s own investment-backed expectations”162 would help in 
clarifying takings jurisprudence. 
As land economist William Wade notes, the Penn Central text (as op-
posed to tests) does include language that “reveals financial and economic 
meaning” both for impact and expectations.163  As Wade suggests, then-
Justice Rehnquist’s apparently idiosyncratic shift in terminology from “dis-
tinct” investment-backed expectations to “reasonable” investment-backed 
expectations in Kaiser Aetna v. United States had the effect of converting land-
owners’ informed judgments about future possibilities into a reasonable no-
tice of rules inquiry.164  Professor Frank Michelman, from whom Justice Bren-
nan borrowed the concept, saw expectations in terms of settled expectations 
that should be protected as a matter of fairness.  Justice Brennan’s practical 
use of “expectations” suggests, and Wade’s recent exposition makes clear, 
that the term has more to do with whether unanticipated changes in regula-
158. Id. at 1000 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of reh. en banc) (quoting
First English, 482 U.S. at 322 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
159. See supra Part C. for discussion.
160. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (setting forth key paragraph from
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
161. See Lawson, et al., supra note 49 at 33.
162. Id. at 32.
163. Wade, supra note 59, at 10937.
164. Id. at 10938 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979). 
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tions would “erode economic viability of the investment in the whole prop-
erty after imposition of the unanticipated change in the regulations.”165  
It is axiomatic in property law that “value” is not property.  This is re-
flected in the condemnation law percept that a regulation that merely lowers 
value is not a taking.166  While “value” does measure the apparent pecuniary 
wealth embodied in an asset, ownership of wealth is not the reason individ-
uals acquire property.  Residential buyers value the subjective enjoyment of 
ownership, and, more germane to this Article, commercial buyers relish the 
opportunity to acquire favorable investments.  Potential investments are 
valued by comparing the periodic stream of income that they generate, such 
as rental fees, together with ultimate net sales proceeds, against the period-
ic costs that they generate, such as taxes and maintenance, together with 
the initial purchase price.  All must be adjusted to some common temporal 
reference point, which is expressed as all cash flows being discounted to 
present value. 
What determines whether an investment is a favorable investment is 
not its net present value, but whether the return on the investment exceeds 
that on other deals of comparable risk.  The result is that an investor em-
ploys as a benchmark the going rate of return on equity in the marketplace 
for comparable investments and determines if the proposed deal is favora-
ble or unfavorable in that light.  The focus of Tahoe-Sierra was the value of the 
lots upon which middle-income individuals wanted to build their own re-
tirement homes.  They were not seeking to generate income from their par-
cels, and so the Supreme Court’s simplistic views of present and future val-
ue harmed prospective retirement homeowners less than it harmed the 
conceptual rigor of temporary takings.  On the other hand, the Cienega Gar-
dens and CCA investors were interested in juggling debt servicing, taxes, re-
pairs, and in whether authorized rentals would be enough to pay expenses 
and generate an adequate yearly return on investment. 
This is at the heart of the debate between the return-on-equity ap-
proach of Cienega VIII167 and the Court of Federal Claims original opinion in 
CCA Associates168 on one hand, and the regulation’s effect on the value of the 
parcel as a whole in Cienega X169 and the Claims Court’s second opinion in 
CCA Associates on the other.170 
165. Id. at 10938.
166. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust,
508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (“[M]ere diminution in the value of property, however seri-
ous, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking.”). 
167. Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Cienega VIII). 
168. CCA Assocs. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 170 (2007).
169. Cienega Gardens v. United States, 503 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Cienega X). 
170. CCA Assocs. v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 580 (2010)
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The Cienega X concept of “economic impact” on value of the “parcel as a 
whole” makes little sense for investors expected to act on “investment-
backed expectations.”  The fact that CCA investors were deemed to have 
gone from a Cienega VIII-based 81.25 percent diminution of return on equity 
over the five-year taking period based on lost rental income,171 to a Cienega X-
based 18 percent economic loss, inevitably will encourage future regulators 
to impose large (and uncompensated) losses now, with the rationalization 
that the spirits and fisc of claimants will be “lifted” at some unspecified 
time.172 
The Cienega X quest for a rule based on economic impact on value in a 
business setting marked by short- and medium-term investments dependent 
on cash flow also is reminiscent of California judicial attempts to reconcile 
rent controlled landlords’ constitutional right to a “just and reasonable re-
turn on their property,”enunciated by the state supreme court in Birkenfeld 
v. City of Berkeley,173with the fact that landlords purchased their buildings at
different times, with different debt service costs, and different levels of ex-
penses.  The lower courts, for a time, tried to square the circle of “just and
reasonable” returns with the policy of rent control to keep rents low without
considering the circumstances of individual landlords.  Finally, in Fisher v.
City of Berkeley, the California Supreme Court warned lower courts not to as-
sume that its Birkenfeld “just and reasonable return” requirement set any
“specific constitutional standard.”174
C. The Role of Offsetting Benefits
1. Burden of Proof
The U.S. Supreme Court established long ago that eminent domain 
just compensation awards should be offset by benefits provided to the 
condemnee in connection with the taking that are special and direct.175 
In Cienega X,176 the Federal Circuit discussed “benefits that the statutory 
scheme afforded which were specifically designed to ameliorate the impact 
171. CCA Assocs. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 170, 199 (2007).
172. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
332 (2002). 
173. Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001, 1027 (Cal. 1976).
174. Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 693 P.2d 261, 291 n. 35 (Cal. 1984), aff’d, 475 U.S.
260 (1986). 
175. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897).  See supra notes 63-64 and ac-
companying text for discussion. 
176. Cienega Gardens v. United States, 503 F.3d 1266, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Cienega X). 
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of the prepayment restrictions.”177  It rejected the characterization below by 
the Court of Federal Claims that such benefits were inadequate compensa-
tion for takings.178  Instead, quoting Penn Central, it stated “these benefits 
‘undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial burdens the law has imposed on 
the appellants and, for that reason, are to be taken into account in consider-
ing the impact of the regulation.’”179 
In CCA Associates,180 the Federal Circuit held that the Court of Federal 
Claims “correctly explained that its offsetting benefits analysis ‘must con-
sider facts as they existed in New Orleans at the time, not merely what the 
regulations indicate was possible.’”181  The Claims Court then “analyzed dif-
ferent benefits” under LIHPRHA, “concluding, inter alia, that a ‘fair-market 
sale . . . is too speculative to offset the economic loss imposed on CCA by 
the prepayment restrictions.’”182  “As part of this analysis, the court conclud-
ed that ‘the burden is on the government to show that other statutory bene-
fits should offset’ the economic impact.”183 
We see no error in this analysis and apportionment of the respec-
tive burdens.  Although the plaintiff has the burden to prove a 
taking occurred, this ultimate burden does not require the plain-
tiff to identify and come forward with evidence rebutting eco-
nomic harm.  The plaintiff must establish economic impact, but 
it need not establish the absence of any mitigating factors.  Off-
setting benefits, if there are any, must be established by the gov-
ernment to rebut the plaintiff’s economic impact case. . . . Once 
CCA came forward with evidence of an economic impact, the 
government then had the burden to establish any offsetting ben-
efits which would mitigate or reduce the impact.  Contrary to the 
government’s argument, and the dissent’s claims, nothing in 
Cienega X requires the plaintiff to bear the burden of establishing 
the value of offsetting benefits.  What Cienega X held is that, in 
assessing whether a takings has occurred, ‘‘available offsetting 
benefits must be taken into account generally, along with the 
particular benefits that actually were offered to the plaintiffs.” 
This is precisely what was done here.184 
177. Id. at 1283.
178. Id.
179. Id. (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978). 
180. CCA Assocs. v. United States, 667 F.3d 1239, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
181. Id. (quoting 91 Fed. Cl. at 612).
182. Id. (quoting 91 Fed. Cl. at 612).
183. Id. (quoting 91 Fed. Cl. at 613-14).
184. Id. at 1245 (quoting Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1287).
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Judge Dyk, dissenting on this issue, described LIHPRHA as a govern-
ment program that imposed “a form of rent control on the developers of 
low-income housing that received federal assistance,” but which permitted 
them to “escape the rent-control regulation” by exercising a statutory right 
of sale or prepayment that Cienega X characterized as “offsetting benefits.”185  
He asserted that the Claims Court’s “refus[al] to consider offsetting bene-
fits . . . finding those benefits to be speculative,” was “in direct contradic-
tion” of Cienega X, and that the CCA Associates panel majority approved this 
“without justification.”186 
Judge Dyk noted that the Supreme Court places the burden on takings 
claimants.187  He added: “As we said in Cienega X, for each of the Penn Central 
factors, ‘the burden is on the owners.’”188  Also, he added, the plaintiffs had 
better access to the necessary information regarding betterment offsets, 
since they were “well aware of the scope of the regulatory scheme.”189  Judge 
Dyk drew an analogy to contract cases, where “‘a non-breaching plaintiff 
bears the burden of persuasion to establish both the costs that it incurred 
and the costs that it avoided as a result of a breach of contract.’”190  It might 
be that, “[i]n such contexts, ‘the breaching party may be responsible for af-
firmatively pointing out costs that were avoided,’ but ultimately ‘the plaintiff 
must incorporate them into a plausible model of [] damages.’”191 
The issue of burden of proof respecting special benefits is not neatly 
drawn.  The Claims Court agreed “CCA undoubtedly has the burden of proof 
on each of the Penn Central factors, including that of economic impact.”192  It 
added, though, that “[o]nce CCA has established the economic impact of the 
restriction in question, the burden is on the government to show that other 
statutory benefits should offset that impact.”193  
The Claims Court cited for that proposition Rose Acre Farms, where the 
Federal Circuit refused to consider offsetting economic benefits “because 
185. Id. at 1251 (Dyk, J., concurring in the judgments and dissenting in part).
186. Id. (Dyk, J., concurring in the judgments and dissenting in part).
187. Id. (Dyk, J., concurring in the judgments and dissenting in part) (quoting
Eastern Enters., 524 U.S. 498, 523 (1998) (“a party challenging governmental action 
as an unconstitutional taking bears a substantial burden”). 
188. Id. at 1252 (Dyk, J., concurring in the judgments and dissenting in part)
(quoting Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1288). 
189. Id. at 1253 (Dyk, J., concurring in the judgments and dissenting in part).
190. Id. at 1254 (Dyk, J., concurring in the judgments and dissenting in part)
(quoting Boston Edison Co. v. United States, 658 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
191. Id. (Dyk, J., concurring in the judgments and dissenting in part) (quoting
Boston Edison, 658 F.3d at 1369. 
192. CCA Assocs. v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 580, 613 (2010).
193. Id. at  613-14 (emphasis added).
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‘the government points to no economic data in the record to support its as-
sertion of benefits.’”194  It also cited Whitney Benefits, which “reject[ed] the 
government’s argument that a coal exchange should be considered in as-
sessing economic impact.”195  “To hold otherwise,” the Claims Court con-
cluded, “would require CCA to prove a negative—to prove that nothing else 
in the statute could provide any offsetting economic benefit.”196  Some no-
tions of government benefit that would vitiate takings claims do appear ex-
travagant.  The New York Court of Appeals’ opinion in Penn Central, averring 
that the State commandeered “the accumulated indirect social and direct 
governmental investment” that provided most of its value to physical prop-
erty,197 seems an example of such imaginary extravaganza.  This points out to 
the need of limiting “special benefits” to those explicitly categorized as such 
in the statute imposing burdens. 
Judge Dyk’s dissent also cited to Rose Acre Farms, stating that the “snip-
pet of language” about the government not pointing to economic data re-
ferred to “indirect benefits flowing from” efforts to solve a regulatory prob-
lem, rather than from provisions in the regulation itself.198 
Thus, there is agreement that a regulatory takings plaintiff has the 
burden of proof on each of the Penn Central factors, including economic im-
pact, and that the government has the burden with respect to benefits not 
intrinsic to the statutory scheme.  Within the scheme itself, however, the 
CCA Associates majority recognized that Cienega X required that ‘‘available off-
setting benefits must be taken into account generally, along with the particular 
benefits that actually were offered to the plaintiffs.”199  Judge Dyk stated that 
the claimant must take all such information, including any supplied by the 
government, and “must incorporate them into a plausible model of [] dam-
ages.’”200 
The question might come down to a semantic dispute about how ex-
actly all of the information must be incorporated by the claimant into a 
194. Id. at 614 (quoting Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 559 F.3d 1260,
1275 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
195. Id. (citing Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 1175
(Fed. Cir. 1991). 
196. Id.
197. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1273-74 (N.Y.
1977), aff’d, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
198. CCA Assocs. v. United States, 667 F.3d 1239, 1254 (Dyk, J., concurring in
the judgments and dissenting in part). 
199. Id. (Dyk, J., concurring in the judgments and dissenting in part) (quoting
Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1287) (emphasis added). 
200. Id. (Dyk, J., concurring in the judgments and dissenting in part) (quoting
Boston Edison, 658 F.3d at 1369). 
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“plausible” model, and how detained, and plausible, that model must be. 
So long as the trial court refrains from totally disregarding germane and 
credible evidence in the record, it is likely to prevail under the Federal Cir-
cuit’s “clear error” standard of review.201 
2. “Speculation” in Establishing Offsetting Benefits
A related issue is whether the Court of Federal Claims could disregard 
evidence of statutory special benefit as being speculative, and, if so, to what 
extent.  In his dissent in CCA Associates, Judge Dyk disagreed with the majori-
ty’s approval of the Court of Federal Claims’ characterization of the offset-
ting benefits as “speculative.”202  While agreeing with the majority’s determi-
nation that an 18 percent economic impact was insufficient to establish a 
taking, he asserted that the analysis “entirely ignores offsetting benefits.”203 
Judge Dyk noted the government’s expert report indicating that the po-
tential to sell the property, exit the program, or raise rents required an ad-
justment that would lower the reduction in value from 18 percent to 5 per-
cent.204  “However,” he added, “the Claims Court held that offsetting benefits 
could only be taken into account if there was ‘reasonable certainty’ that a 
sale would have occurred, and that such a reasonable certainty did not ex-
ist.”205  Thus, “[t]he possibility that CCA could exit the program was []’specu-
lative.’”206  
Judge Dyk also maintained that the Claims Court mistakenly thought 
that the value of the statutory options could not be ascertained because 
they had not been availed of, whereas the “proper analysis is whether a pro-
spective purchaser . . . would have attributed value” to them.207 
The majority approved the Claims Court’s conclusion that “a fair-
market sale . . . is too speculative to offset the economic loss imposed on 
CCA by the prepayment restrictions.”208  Might the lack of “reasonable cer-
201. See Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. cir.
2004) (stating the Federal Circuit reviews legal determinations of the Court of Federal 
Claims without deference and its findings of fact for clear error). 
202. Id. (Dyk, J., concurring in the judgments and dissenting in part) (citing
CCA Assocs., 91 Fed. Cl. at 618). 
203. Id. (Dyk, J., concurring in the judgments and dissenting in part).
204. Id. at 125 (Dyk, J., concurring in the judgments and dissenting in part).
205. Id. (Dyk, J., concurring in the judgments and dissenting in part) (quoting
CCA Assocs., 91 Fed. Cl. at 618). 
206. Id. at 1255 (Dyk, J., concurring in the judgments and dissenting in part)
(quoting CCA Assocs., 91 Fed. Cl. at 618). 
207. Id. at 1255 (Dyk, J., concurring in the judgments and dissenting in part).
208. Id. at 1245 (internal quotations omitted).
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tainty that a buyer would be available” be a consideration leading to the 
conclusion that the possibility of a sale would be “too speculative”? 
The probability of zoning changes, variances, or other actions that 
might affect market value properly is included in real property appraisals.209  
Clearly, speculation affects market value.  Furthermore, in Florida Rock Indus-
tries, the Federal Circuit declared that “a speculative market provides a land-
owner with monetary compensation which is just as satisfactory as that pro-
vided by any other market.”210 
However, the leading treatise on condemnation warns that, “[a] bene-
fit, to be considered at all, must not be so remote or speculative as to be in-
capable of a reasonably accurate monetary measurement.”211  In United States 
v. 930.65 Acres of Land,212 the U.S. district court admonished:
[T]he courts are agreed on the proposition that remote, uncer-
tain, contingent, imaginary, speculative, conjectural, chimerical,
mythical, or hypothetical benefits cannot, under any circum-
stances, be taken into consideration.  The reason for this is that
otherwise the property owner might be compelled to pay for
something which would never be in existence.  It has been said
that if speculative or chimerical benefits could be considered, the
constitutional safeguards for protecting the citizen in the enjoy-
ment of his property would be rendered of no avail.213
An analogous interest often deemed speculative is the possibility of 
reverter, which rarely is eligible to receive a just compensation when the 
property it relates to is taken by the United States.  “Generally, no compen-
sation is due to a holder of a possibility of reverter unless the reversion is 
reasonably probable within a short period of time of condemnation.”214  The 
209. See, e.g. City of Las Vegas v. Bustos, 75 P.3d 351, 352-353 (Nev. 2003) (zon-
ing changes or variances that are reasonably probable may be considered when de-
termining the highest and best use of the property); Eric Thomas Carver, A Valuation 
Primer: Trends and Techniques for Estate Planners, 77 MICH. B.J. 1304, 1309 (1998) (citing 
Michael F. Beausang, 830 TM, Valuation: General and Real Estate (noting the im-
portance of documentation the present status of the property, the area in which it is 
located, the present zoning conditions, and the possibility of zoning changes). 
210. Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
211. NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, § 8A.02 [3] (citing, e.g., Bauman v. Ross, 167
U.S. 548 (1897); 6,816.5 Acres of Land v. United States, 411 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1969). 
212. United States v. 930. 65 Acres of Land, 299 F. Supp. 673, 676-677 (D. Kan. 1968). 
213. Id. at 676-77.
214. U.S. v. 32.42 Acres of Land, More or Less Located in San Diego County
State of California, 2009 WL 2424303 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (not reported in F.Supp.2d). 
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held in Mount Olivet Cemetery Asso-
ciation v. Salt Lake City,215 that a possibility of reverter owned by the United 
States was “minimal and speculative” and insufficient to constitute property 
owned by the United States for purposes of preempting state authority. 
As is the case with the burden of proof for special benefits, the answer 
in a given case might come down to whether the court interprets Cienega X to 
demand that the claimant generally take into account possibly probable 
events, or that the claimant construct rigorous models incorporating them. 
A court that balances these concerns with prudence is unlikely to commit 
clear error.216 
IV. Conclusion
Many received truths of property and takings law are proclaimed regu-
larly and for extended periods, until they are tested by reality.  Thus, under 
the ad coleum doctrine, airspace had been viewed as an extension of the land 
below, something changed by the advent of flight.217  In the field of takings, a 
quarter-century of usage by the Supreme Court of the Agins v. City of Tiburon 
“substantially advance legitimate state interests” formula218 was held not to 
be a takings test at all, but rather mere “imprecise” language in Lingle v. Chev-
ron U.S.A., a case in which the language was crucial.219 
It may be that the Supreme Court will revisit the Penn Central formula-
tion, which started with a concept of explaining the regulatory taking that 
was explicitly ad hoc, and has, over time, become a fossilized branching of 
tests and subtests.  The “economic impact of the regulation on the claimant” 
test explored here is a prime example of the need for a fresh examination of 
Penn Central and the need for a vibrant and coherent law of takings. 
215. Mount Olivet Cemetery Ass’n v. Salt Lake City, 164 F.3d 480, 485 (10th Cir. 1998). 
216. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text for discussion.
217. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 18 (photo.
reprint 1979) (1766); JESSE DUKEMINIER, ET AL., PROPERTY 120 n.10 (7th ed. 2010) (“to 
whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the depths”). 
218. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
219. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528, 531-32 (2005).
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